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Letters related to material pub-
lished in Psychiatric Services will
be sent to authors for possible re-
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Services, APA, 1400 K Street,




To the Editor: In their excellent re-
view of neuroleptic malignant syn-
drome (NMS) published in the Sep-
tember 1998 issue, Pelonero and as-
sociates (1) called attention to the
role of poorly controlled or treat-
ment-resistant extrapyramidal symp-
toms as risk factors for NMS. We
would like to amplify this point and
call attention to the association be-
tween HIV infection and increased
sensitivity to extrapyramidal symp-
toms. Several authors have reported
on cases of NMS in patients with
AIDS, leading us to wonder whether
advanced HIV infection may be a risk
factor for NMS.
Breitbart and associates (2) report-
ed three cases of NMS in patients
with AIDS dementia who were treat-
ed with neuroleptics. Rosebush and
Stewart (3) reported on 24 cases of
NMS occurring in 20 patients, one of
whom was a 31-year-old man with
AIDS. Swenson and associates (4) re-
ported a case of AIDS and dementia
in a man who developed severe ex-
trapyramidal symptoms with many
features of NMS while being treated
with a phenothiazine, prochlorper-
azine, as an antiemetic. Vogel-Scibil-
ia and colleagues (5) identified an
episode of NMS in a literature review
of 13 cases of HIV infection present-
ing as psychosis, of whom seven were
treated with neuroleptics.
These case reports call attention to
the possible role of HIV infection as
a risk factor for NMS. Several of
these authors observe that HIV infec-
tion of the central nervous system
may increase a patient’s susceptibility
to extrapyramidal symptoms. If in-
creased sensitivity to extrapyramidal
symptoms is a risk factor for NMS, as
Pelonero and associates suggest, then
it follows that HIV infection may pre-
dispose to NMS.
Of note, five of the six cases of NMS
reported by the authors cited above
occurred in patients with AIDS, and
most involved the use of standard, as
opposed to atypical, antipsychotics.
Some authors have suggested that the
increased sensitivity to extrapyramidal
symptoms may be a direct effect of
HIV on the basal ganglia. At the very
least, clinical caution is indicated
when using standard antipsychotics in
the treatment of patients with ad-
vanced HIV infection or AIDS.
Ewald Horwath, M.D.
Francine Cournos, M.D.
Dr. Horwath is associate clinical professor
of psychiatry and Dr. Cournos is professor
of clinical psychiatry at Columbia Univer-
sity College of Physicians and Surgeons in
New York City.
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In Reply: We believe several impor-
tant issues should be considered re-
garding NMS and HIV infection.
Epidemiologically, one cannot con-
clude from a series of cases separate
from a defined population that the
risks of NMS will be higher in per-
sons with HIV infection. There may
also be reporting bias; that is, so
many case reports of NMS have ap-
peared in the literature that NMS
cases with interesting comorbidities
may be more likely to be submitted
and published than reports of “rou-
tine” cases.
If NMS does occur more often in
patients with AIDS, such occurrence
might be a nonspecific effect of other
recognized risk factors such as dehy-
dration, malnutrition, or organic
brain disease. In any case, we cer-
tainly agree that clinicians should be
on the alert for NMS in patients with
AIDS. Fever, altered mental status,
and autonomic instability are fre-
quent in AIDS, making NMS more
difficult to discern.
Anthony L. Pelonero, M.D.
James L. Levenson, M.D.
Anand K. Pandurangi, M.D.
Physician-Assisted Suicide
To the Editor: The November 1998
debate on physician-assisted suicide
between Drs. Hartmann and Meyer-
son (1), followed by the paper from
the Netherlands by Dr. Shoevers and
associates (2), raises significant issues
about how psychiatrists ought to con-
duct themselves if asked to assist in
suicide.
Unfortunately, the debate between
Hartmann and Meyerson ignores the
clinical context and concentrates in-
stead on ethical, moral, and philo-
sophical issues. While consideration
of these issues is important, we be-
lieve the narrow focus on them will
not resolve the question of whether
legislation should allow physician-as-
sisted suicide. What we are left with
is disagreement as to what is ethical
and what is not, and a choice be-
tween different philosophical ver-
sions of the notion of autonomy of
the individual. Such questions need
to be placed in the clinical context,
specifically the way decisions of life
and death can be affected by the vi-
cissitudes of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship (3).
Whether a physician should assist
in a patient’s suicide remains funda-
mentally a question about the frame-
work and boundaries of clinical prac-
tice. To draw a parallel, we suggest
that whether a physician should en-
gage in a sexual relationship with a
patient is less a moral or philosophi-
cal issue than one of therapeutic
boundaries. The therapeutic frame-
work that implicitly and explicitly
forbids a sexual relationship allows
the doctor to examine the patient’s
feelings with the patient. Whether a
patient who seeks a sexual relation-
ship with the doctor is “competent”
is not the issue. The very presence of
the prohibition against a sexual rela-
tionship makes it possible for the pa-
tient’s wishes to be dealt with in a
therapeutic manner.
We contend that the same thera-
peutic framework applies to requests
for physician-assisted suicide. With-
out a framework that prohibits the
action, a doctor is not able to care-
fully examine the possible meanings
of such a request in the total context
of the patient’s life, and indeed in the
context of the relationship with the
doctor. Such a process of therapeutic
engagement is not possible within a
legislative framework in which assist-
ing suicide is a potential outcome.
Much of the debate about eu-
thanasia and physician-assisted sui-
cide has as its underlying assumption
that doctors will always act in the in-
terests of their patients. This as-
sumption fails to take into account
the doctor’s unconscious and indeed
sometimes conscious wishes for the
patient to die and thereby to relieve
everyone, including the doctor, of
distress. The Dutch authors rightly
point to the question of the violation
of therapeutic boundaries and the
role of countertransference in influ-
encing how doctors behave toward
suicidal patients. We suggest that
countertransference is also an issue
with terminally ill patients, where
disgust with disease and decay may
operate (4).
Legislation to enable assisted sui-
cide has been designed to provide a
safeguard, through psychiatric as-
sessment, that protects patients from
themselves (5). What these laws do
not do and cannot do is protect the
patient against unconscious factors
in the doctor.
Francis T. Varghese, M.B.B.S.,
F.R.A.N.Z.C.P.
Brian J. Kelly, Ph.D.,
F.R.A.N.Z.C.P.
Dr. Varghese and Dr. Kelly are associate
professors in the department of psychiatry
at the University of Queensland in Bris-
bane, Australia. Dr. Varghese is chair of
the division of mental health and Dr. Kelly
is director of consultation-liaison psychia-
try at the Princess Alexandra Hospital and
District Health Service in Brisbane.
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To the Editor: Thank you for pub-
lishing the articles on physician-as-
sisted suicide by Hartmann and Mey-
erson and Schoevers and associates in
the November 1998 issue. That psy-
chiatrists are considering the issue is a
sign of a profound shift in the under-
lying philosophical assumptions of
our culture.
The traditional psychiatric frame
of reference about the wish to die
evolved at a time when people ac-
cepted the sanctity of life as a reli-
gious principle. There was no need
to explicitly build it into our concept
of treatment. When a patient came
to the psychiatrist and said, “I want
to die,” the psychiatrist knew the
message was, “Even though my life is
valuable, I have frightening wishes to
die. Please help me.” Even when psy-
chotherapy and medications didn’t
work, we protected our patients, ex-
pecting that after a while they would
no longer be dangerous to them-
selves. Our expectations were ful-
filled. No patient who was placed on
suicide precautions remained there
until he or she died from old age.
Today we can no longer count on
our practitioners’ or our patients’ be-
lief in the sanctity of life. This shift
leaves a dangerous gap in our diag-
nostic manual. A patient with feel-
ings of hopelessness and suicidal
ideation who does not meet diagnos-
tic criteria for any of the disorders
can be perceived as making a ratio-
nal choice for suicide. One of the
cases cited by Schoevers and associ-
ates and discussed elsewhere by
Hendin (1) fell into this category.
If we are willing to consider hope-
lessness and suicidality as a psychi-
atric disorder, there is certainly no
lack of good treatments. Thanks to
the work of Albert Ellis (2) and
Aaron Beck (3), we have powerful
cognitive techniques that we could
offer to far more patients than we
currently do (4), and we can hope for
future medications to help them as
well. Including hopelessness and sui-
cidality as a psychiatric disorder will
help us with bedside consultations,
where physicians may take our judg-
ment of “no psychiatric disorder” as
automatic permission for physician-
assisted suicide.
If we do not include hopelessness
and suicidality as a psychiatric disor-
der, then we must make it clear that
a doctor cannot offer a biological
treatment for it in the form of lethal
medication. To do otherwise encour-
ages absurdity. It is ridiculous to
treat the nonmedical disorder of sui-
cidality and perceived hopelessness
with a medical treatment that causes
the patient to die. The medication
gets rid of the symptoms, but it has
death as a side effect. Since when do
we consider that acceptable?
Our psychiatric wards are full of
patients with more tragedy in their
lives than the cases described by
Schoevers and associates. If we do
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not educate our psychiatrists to know
their professional limits, these pa-
tients’ lives could be at risk.
Barbara A. Olevitch, Ph.D.
Dr. Olevitch is courtesy assistant profes-
sor of psychiatry at the Missouri Institute
of Mental Health, School of Medicine,
University of Missouri–Columbia.
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To the Editor: Reasoning by analogy
can be misleading. In their Novem-
ber 1998 article discussing develop-
ments in the Netherlands concerning
physician-assisted suicide in psychia-
try, Schoevers and associates state
that “a comparison with the death
penalty may not be as far-fetched as it
seems; the death of an innocent per-
son is always one death too many.”
The authors thus suggest an analogy
between the death penalty and physi-
cian-assisted suicide in psychiatry, at
least as far as it concerns the deaths
of “innocent persons.” This pre-
sumed analogy, however, is defective
for a number of reasons.
First, leaving exceptional cases
aside, persons who are confronted
with the death penalty have no wish
to die. Psychiatric patients who have
an enduring wish for assistance in
suicide, on the other hand, want life
to end because they consider them-
selves to be suffering unbearably,
with no prospect for relief.
Second, presume for the sake of
argument that the taking of the life of
a guilty person by the state can be
justifiable under specific conditions.
The legal standards of evidence that
can justify the death penalty in an in-
dividual case are not necessarily the
same standards of evidence that
ought to be applied to morally or
legally justify physician-assisted sui-
cide. The implication of the analysis
by Schoevers and associates seems to
be that the standards of evidence in
cases of physician-assisted suicide
should at least be comparable to the
standards for a death penalty sen-
tence. But it is not at all evident what
the right standards in physician-as-
sisted suicide should be.
Reasoning by analogy can be dan-
gerous. If such reasoning takes place
for rhetorical reasons, we should be
particularly cautious. Taking the life
of an innocent person who is be-
lieved to have committed a serious
crime is not comparable to assisting
in the suicide of a mentally ill person
who is considered incurable, but who
might in fact have been curable if his
or her life was not ended, perhaps
because a new treatment eventually
was developed. In the latter case, we
will not even be able to make a valid
statement about “innocent” patients:
in retrospect we can never be sure
that the patient would have been cur-
able.
For some, this uncertainty is pre-
cisely the ultimate argument for cat-
egorically opposing physician-assist-
ed suicide. Indeed, only when cer-
tainty is assured will we be able to to-
tally rule out “innocent” candidates
for assisted suicide. As a conse-
quence, however, mentally ill but
competent patients who suffer se-
verely and hopelessly are left alone.
The morality of physician-assisted
suicide in psychiatry needs a differ-
ent weighing of values, norms, and
interests than the morality of the
death penalty.
Ron L. P. Berghmans, Ph.D.
Dr. Berghmans is a senior research associ-
ate at the Institute for Bioethics in Maas-
tricht and is affiliated with the depart-
ment of health ethics and philosophy at
the University of Maastricht in the
Netherlands.
In Reply: Dr. Berghmans rightly
draws attention to the differences be-
tween the evaluation of a request for
physician assisted suicide by a suffer-
ing psychiatric patient and the judi-
cial process leading to the death
penalty for persons who have com-
mitted criminal offenses, in countries
where this sentence exists.
The analogy with the death sen-
tence was used in the context of a dis-
cussion of the incurability of psychi-
atric disorders, in which we asked
whether psychiatrists can provide suf-
ficient certainty on the treatment
prognosis of their patients to warrant
assisting a suicide. The analogy was
not based on a literal interpretation,
but rather on the fact that decisions
on life and death are final and should
be carried out only when there is cer-
tainty that the decision is right. The
need for certainty places a heavy re-
sponsibility on those who have to
make such decisions, whether judges
or physicians, and on the evaluation
procedure that is to be followed.
In our paper we underlined the
uncertainties and complexities of
such an evaluation procedure, applic-
able to psychiatric patients with a
death wish who turn to their psychia-
trist for help. We hope we made clear
what those complexities are, and how
a policy favoring physician-assisted
suicide may fundamentally affect
clinical practice. By focusing on a
“new treatment that may eventually
be developed,” Dr. Berghmans failed
to address some of the key issues we
raised.
Robert A. Schoevers, M.D.
Frank P. Asmus, M.D.
Willem Van Tilburg, M.D., Ph.D.
Medication Compliance
To the Editor: The article on crimi-
nal victimization of persons with se-
vere mental illness by Hiday and as-
sociates (1) in the January 1999 issue
is an important contribution. Con-
spicuously absent, however, is any
mention of medication compliance
among the 331 study subjects with se-
vere mental disorders. Because they
all had been involuntarily admitted
and subsequently court-ordered to
outpatient commitment after hospital
discharge, it seems highly probable
that they had not been compliant with
their psychiatric medications before
admission, since noncompliance is
the usual cause for outpatient com-
mitment.
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In another paper, the authors indi-
cated that 71 percent of the study
group were noncompliant with their
medication (2). This finding implies
that there is a direct relationship be-
tween medication noncompliance
and criminal victimization, which
many of us have observed anecdotally
among our patients.
E. Fuller Torrey, M.D.
Dr. Torrey is president of the Treatment
Advocacy Center in Arlington, Virginia.
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In Reply: Dr. Torrey correctly points
out that our sample was involuntarily
hospitalized and subsequently court-
ordered to outpatient commitment,
orders generally associated with non-
compliance, and, furthermore, that
our sample had a 71 percent non-
compliance rate, as we reported in
another article (reference 2 above).
He concludes that these factors indi-
cate “a direct relationship between
medication noncompliance and crim-
inal victimization.” 
It is possible that taking antipsy-
chotic medication may reduce the
risk of victimization by ameliorating
symptoms such as disorientation,
which might cause a severely mental-
ly ill person to wander into dangerous
areas, appear more vulnerable, and
thus be criminally victimized, or by
ameliorating symptoms such as an-
noying behavior, which might be
provocative of abuse from acquain-
tances and friends. But we believe
that the relationship between med-
ication noncompliance and criminal
victimization is more complicated.
Victimization reflects exposure to
crime and violence in the social envi-
ronment. Our analysis, along with the
analyses of others who have looked at
the problem, shows that victimiza-
tion is associated with a constellation
of problems such as alcohol abuse,
drug dependence, homelessness, and
mental disorder. Additionally, in our
sample and in other samples of per-
sons without mental disorders, vic-
timization is associated with criminal
and violent behavior. 
Our second paper to which Dr.
Torrey refers reported that medica-
tion noncompliance has a significant
effect on violence only in interaction
with substance abuse. As we suggest,
medication noncompliance may lead
to self-medicating with alcohol or
drugs, and the subsequent impair-
ment may impede medication adher-
ence so that focusing on treatment of
one without the other is unlikely to
lead to effective reduction of vio-
lence and victimization. Problems of
the social environment, such as
homelessness, need to be addressed
as well.
Virginia Aldigé Hiday, Ph.D.
Jeffrey W. Swanson, Ph.D.
H. Ryan Wagner, Ph.D.
A Note on Competition 
and Profit in Medical Care
To the Editor: The exchange be-
tween Stone and Blackwell (1,2) in
the September and December 1998
issues is far from trivial and deserves
wide-ranging discussion. The estab-
lishment of medicine as a profession
around the turn of the century had
salutary influences on the autonomy,
power, prestige, and quality of med-
ical practice. The territorial claims
and many defensive battles over the
boundaries of the profession pro-
tected medical practice from the
crass competitive commercialism
that was rampant at that time. Mo-
nopolistic control, securely main-
tained until after World War II, con-
tributed to both the quality of med-
ical care and the development of the
infrastructure of education and re-
search.
For the first 25 years the hospital
insurance industry did not challenge
the power and prestige of the med-
ical profession. Nor did it challenge
the prerogatives of the doctor to
make the decisions about clinical
events, and so the impossible-to-de-
fine phrase “medical necessity” was
invented. But now we can make only
empty and impotent claims to those
prerogatives and blame managed
care because we must compete in a
sordid profit-dominated market-
place like any other business or in-
dustry. As reprehensible as managed
care organizations may be, they did
not introduce either competition or
the profit motive. Physicians must
accept some historical responsibility
for our current position.
For example, in 1963 advocacy by
the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion played a major role in the nego-
tiations of the United Auto Workers
contract that established the princi-
ple that insurance would pay for out-
patient psychotherapy. The unin-
tended economic consequence was
that such payment presented irre-
sistible financial opportunities for
other professions and encouraged
the development of new “products.”
Psychiatrists no longer maintained a
monopoly over psychiatric services
and were on the unrecognized brink
of overexpanding costs of health care
to employers. Granted, psychiatry
has always been a relatively unim-
portant but vulnerable player in the
health care economy. But managed
care didn’t even exist.
The profit motive was established
in health care by the federal Medi-
care and Medicaid legislation of 1965.
This legislation converted hospitals
from charitable institutions into prof-
it-making enterprises. Interestingly
enough, organized medicine was not
attending to the impact of this legisla-
tion on the industrialization and mon-
etization of health care. Instead, orga-
nized medicine feared the regulatory
influence of government. Compro-
mises were made to accept govern-
ment-financed health care as long as
the medical profession maintained
control over clinical decisions, and
the doctor-patient relationship was
protected. “Medical necessity,” mean-
ing “what the doctor said,” was pro-
moted to unsustainable importance.
Even psychiatrists basked in the glow
of expanding funds for health care.
Managed care didn’t arrive for anoth-
er 20 years, but the profit motive in
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES © April 1999   Vol.  50   No.  4 567
LETTERS
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES © April 1999   Vol.  50   No.  4568
the economics of health care had
been unleashed. We were there and
profited.
To address the issue of the rele-
vance of information in efficient mar-
kets, raised by Dr. Stone, we might
note that the technology of many
products such as computers, automo-
biles, airline tickets, and financial op-
erations, has surpassed the informa-
tion available to the ordinary con-
sumer of these products. Health care
products are no longer unique.
Frank T. Rafferty, M.D.
Dr. Rafferty is affiliated with the Gateway
Center for Human Development in
Brunswick, Georgia.
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Placebos in Research
To the Editor: In a letter to the edi-
tor in the May 1998 issue, McCarthy
(1) posed important and potentially
disturbing questions about the ability
of patients with schizophrenia to ful-
ly understand the implications of re-
ceiving a placebo in a clinical trial
and to provide genuine informed
consent. 
We fully agree with McCarthy that
all necessary measures should be tak-
en to assess and facilitate patients’
understanding of the research pro-
cess and to safeguard their rights. In-
vestigators and other parties, such as
institutional review boards, must be
vigilant in this regard. Clearly, the
good of society— in particular the in-
terests of other patients with the
same disorder— cannot be used to
justify encroaching on the principles
of beneficence and autonomy as they
apply to the individual patient.
However, in considering the use of
placebos in research, several other is-
sues need to be examined, which we
address briefly below.
Are there viable alternatives to
placebo controls for research? Al-
ternatives to placebo controls include
active controls, who receive the stan-
dard drug for the condition, and his-
torical controls, which are based on
data from previous placebo-con-
trolled studies with similar patients.
Several writers have argued that
placebo controls are essential to clin-
ical trials in certain circumstances
and that alternative control groups
are inadequate. Given the need for
placebo controls to permit meaning-
ful conclusions to be drawn from
clinical studies, it may be argued that
not using placebo controls would be
unethical because patients receiving
the experimental drug would be ex-
posed to potential risks in a study of
questionable scientific benefit.
What is the potential harm to
patients receiving placebo? Con-
ventional antipsychotics are not uni-
formly effective in schizophrenia, in
particular against negative symp-
toms. Between 30 and 50 percent of
patients are exposed to the risk of
troublesome adverse effects for min-
imal or no benefit (2). Also, contrary
to popular belief, as many as 55 per-
cent of patients who receive placebo
in the acute phase do not worsen, and
up to 25 percent are much improved
(2,3).
In addition, some studies have
found that patients who relapse while
on placebo do not suffer any long-
term consequences. For example,
Curson and associates (4) followed
patients who had participated in a
short-term trial of relapse preven-
tion. They found that although in the
original trial 66 percent of patients
on placebo had relapsed compared
with 8 percent of those on the active
drug, there were no differences be-
tween the two groups in the number
of relapses after the end of the trial
or in any clinical or social variable
over a seven-year follow-up period.
How well informed is the in-
formed consent of patients with
schizophrenia who participate in
clinical trials? Carpenter and asso-
ciates (3) have cited recent research
suggesting that approximately 75
percent of patients with a diagnosis
of schizophrenia incorporate infor-
mation and make decisions much like
comparison groups do when dealing
with consent issues.
What can be done to protect
the individual patient? Explicit
guidelines, such as those adopted by
Loma Linda University (5) or pro-
posed by Carpenter and associates
(3) may aid in protecting psychiatric
patients, particularly those with a
psychotic disorder, who are enrolled
in placebo-controlled trials. Although
researchers must continue to be very
concerned and vigilant about pro-
tecting the rights of subjects partici-
pating in research, the use of place-
bos in research has unique scientific
benefits. With proper care, it need
not be incompatible with concerns
for the safety of the subjects.
Rajnish Mago, M.D.
Richard Petty, M.D.
Paul Root Wolpe, Ph.D.
Dr. Mago is associated with the depart-
ment of psychiatry at the University of
Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. Dr. Petty is
clinical director of the neuropsychiatry
program and Dr. Wolpe is associated with
the Center for Bioethics at the University
of Pennsylvania.
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